In order to formulate better policies for public transport, researchers have sought to review the history of regulations. Good examples are the works of Coase (1974) , Hey (2004) and Mulley (1983 Mulley ( , 1998 . This paper is, in a sense, in the same genre as these studies, but has a specific theoretical focus on economics and planning.
The original purpose of this paper was to investigate if there was any implicit pecuniary consideration that was outside the remit of written franchise licences by the state for franchised buses and ferries it regulated. The motivation for this investigation stemmed from such practical planning issues as the proper regulation of public utilities that are legally protected, the privatization of government monopolies (proponents of which rely on the findings of constant, if not decreasing, returns to scale), the efficient pricing of decreasing costs or natural monopolies (Coase 1946) , and far more abstract theoretical issues, such as the genesis of governmentprotected monopolies in the first place (Coase 1959; Lai and Yu 2002) and the choice of their modes of pricing (Lai et al 2008a (Lai et al , 2008b ).
In the process of searching for pecuniary considerations that did not fall within the terms of the franchise agreements, we discovered that the real subsidies were not monetary, but nonpecuniary and spatial, and that the state had contributed greatly to supporting the franchised public utilities through physical planning under a leasehold land system. The morphology of such planning and some implications of this peculiar system of land tenure for the planning of public bus and ferry transport systems were discussed.
Background [Added, per Editor Point 2; Referee 2 Points 4 & 7]
Consider this criticism of the land administration of lease modifications in Land and the Ruling Class in Hong Kong: Through the workings of the lease modification system, developer conglomerates that acquired utility or public service companies have been able to exploit land assets in those companies. Idled utility sites or public bus depots have been converted into lucrative residential or commercial properties via using that system. This brings out the question of social justice and efficient use of land, the single most valuable natural resource that Hong Kong possesses (Poon 2006: p.111 ).
There has been a growing local public concern in Hong Kong over the takeovers of franchised public utilities by consortia controlled by private development oligarchs and the conversion of government land allocated many years ago to these public utilities on leases for depot and plant use into private office, commercial, and residential developments. It has been suspected that such takeovers were just a means to obtain cheap land for quick profit via real estate redevelopment rather than being socially beneficial long term investments in public utilities.
Regarding franchised public bus transport, which is Hong Kong's dominant mode of domestic public transportation (by 2009, franchised buses still claimed 33% of all internal transport trips, whereas heavy railways captured an equal percentage), Kowloon Motor Bus (KMB); New World First Bus (NWFB) and its predecessor, the China Motor Bus (CMB), which lost its franchised routes on 1 September 1998; and CityBus (CB) are all owned either by developers or have a strategic partnership with a developer. The same applies to the public ferries -Star Ferry (SF) and New World First Ferry -of which the latter took over the bulk of the passenger fleet from Hong Kong Ferry (originally called Hong Kong & Yaumati Ferry (HYF) ) in 1998.
Critics considered the control of franchised public utilities by developers to be not only harmful to the proper operation of these utilities, but also unfair to the public, as the land assets involved were obtained at a low cost. Public suspicion of the oligarchic structure of the developers fuelled occasional protests against the monopolistic control of the land and transport markets, as well as "collusion" between the government and big business.
The looming criticism of developers in relation to the use of the land assets of bus operators should not be viewed in isolation, but interpreted from a public policy development point of view in the wider constitutional context of post-colonial Hong Kong, now witnessing "rising public mistrust of the government and intensifying grassroots grievances" Kuan 2000: p.1024 ).
It is hoped that our project will provide the public and policymakers with a better-informed picture of a key dimension of everyday life in Hong Kong -bus transportation -as well as its real estate implications.
Interestingly, there has never been any suggestion by critics that the bus franchises, which have, since 1933, always been granted on a geographical, or bundled, route basis to private firms, be nationalized or replaced by a public corporation, as in the case of London Transport in the past, or "liberalized" into an unprotected competitive market with a lot more operators, as in the case of Britain today. They simply want them to keep fares low and run more and newer buses on all the routes allocated. However, they also keep an eye on how the land holdings of public utilities are transformed into real estate developments, a process which has apparently also happened to British bus garages.
(1) Besides, there is a body of international literature that generally praises the Hong Kong economy as a successful case of a laissez faire system -a characterization that was seriously disputed by Poon (2006) and questioned by the late Milton Friedman (2006) shortly before he passed away -and that its bus market is among the most open in the world (Hibbs 1985 (Hibbs , 1986 . In addition, overseas observers (for instance, Rowlands 2009) generally found the local bus industry to be admirably profitable without the need for direct government subsidies and excellent in terms of service quality. The same could have been said about the two franchised ferries up until the opening of the first tunnel across Victoria Harbour in 1972.
The rest of the paper is organised into 6 sections. The transport and planning research issues and context are discussed, followed by a general exposition of the general hypothesis and approach to the subject matter. Then, a statement of the specific hypotheses to evaluate and of the methodology and data used is made. Next, the history of franchised bus and ferry operations in Hong Kong is reconstructed prior to a presentation of the findings for the specific hypotheses and their interpretation. The conclusion recapitulates on the nature and contribution of this paper.
The Research Issues and Context [Added, per Editor Point 2; Referee 2 Points 4 & 7]
The question is: was there any real government concession in land cost beyond the terms of the franchise agreements and, if yes, what actually was the concession? This question pertains to a basic area of public policy and theoretical concern, namely legally created or franchised monopolies. These involve such policy issues as the proper regulation of public utilities that are legally protected, privatization (proponents of which rely on the findings of constant returns to scale), efficient pricing for decreasing costs or natural monopolies (Coase 1946) , and theoretical issues like the genesis of government-protected monopolies in the first place (Coase 1959; Lai and Yu 2002) and their efficient pricing (Lai et al 2008a (Lai et al , 2008b ).
The theoretical issue that this paper engages in is the notion of implicit consideration, which is derived from the theory of an implicit contract first developed in labour economics to explain why employers do not reduce wages when there is a slump. Neo-institutional economists have found "implicit institutions" and "implicit relation contracts," or "implicit contracts," to be significant phenomena in economic life (see, for instance, Kasper and Streit 2001: pp. 99-100, 207) . While these institutions and contracts are generally conceived within organizations, it is possible to expand their concept to cover relationships between contracting parties, as in the case of labour economics or franchise agreements, which is a subject matter of this project. The benefits of such contracts are not legally enforceable, as there is no explicit oral or written rule stating that they must be, but they are experienced by parties to a contract to the extent that if such benefits are discontinued, then a party may seriously reconsider its intentions to renew any contract. The idea of an implicit contract has been adopted by public economists to deal with the practical issue of compensating regulated utility companies for sunken investment costs lost when the government opens up a market. It has been argued that under these circumstances, an implicit contract exists in that compensation is warranted (Boyd 1998) . This paper seeks to transfer this application to public bus and ferry franchising under the terminology of implicit consideration.
(2)
The concept of implicit consideration advanced here can be considered "Coasian" in the sense that it is a means of reducing transaction costs to better achieve the terms of an existing contract, or the explicit franchise agreement. The Hong Kong Government enforces the bus franchises in favour of the franchisees, while it prosecutes the operators of unauthorized private bus services and other types of authorized bus service that pick up or drop off passengers in franchised bus parking zones. What implicit benefits besides such explicit contractual protections were provided by government? (3) Prior to examining this factual question, there is a need to elaborate on the relevant research on transport and land use planning to better position this paper.
Economic research on public transport, notably bus franchising, has accumulated a rich corpus of knowledge on the question of economies of scale with a view to evaluating the efficiency implications of regulating or de-regulating public bus and equivalent services (Hibbs 2003 (Hibbs , 2007 ; and on the question of the economic nature of franchising. Interestingly, these two intimately-related questions are seldom jointly treated.
As regards the first question, instances of constant returns to scale, not to mention diseconomies of scale, are generally held as grounds for supporting the privatisation of state transport monopolies. A classic example is the case of UK bus operators in the 1920's, which were found to have enjoyed no more than constant returns (Mulley, 1983, p. 8) . Scale economies are basically an empirical question. Constant returns to scale was the finding in the studies by Koshla (1972) and Lee & Steedman (1970) . Diseconomies of scale can be found in the studies by Wable & Cole (1975) , Koenker (1977) , Obeng (1985) , and Filippini & Prioni (2003) .
Moreover, good examples of diseconomies can be found in the studies by Williams (1979) , Viton (1981), and Berechman (1983) .
As regards the second question, the focus has been on the evolution of the grounds for and structures of franchises as well as the means of granting or capturing such franchises in the past.
A well-known recent development informed by property rights economic reasoning is to conceive of the state as a monopoly of "curb (kerb) rights" (Klein et al., 1997) , which kindles the need for a neo-institutional economic model of bus and ferry franchises. The common ground of various lines of research is that the state is allocating a bundle of legally protected rights and/or economic concessions via the franchise agreement to public bus or ferry operators in return for some fiscal revenue as well as whatever social considerations may be seen to be in line with prevailing public policy. This way of abstraction has two salient features. First, the generalization is one of pure exchange because the role of the state is merely as an auctioneer of monopoly rights. It is not conceived as being involved in any planning or coordinated production activities. Second, the model is a-spatial as land use is not factored into it.
This paper is a pioneering attempt to evaluate the second theoretical question using Hong Kong historical data and experts (operators and officials) in the field to examine the potentially active involvement of the state in investment decisions (i.e. makes forward looking and innovative decisions under uncertainty) as well as in activities with a land use planning and development dimension. Though not being expressly promised entitlements, these state endeavours can be understood as ingredients of an implicit contract that forms part and parcel of the formal public transport franchise.
In this connection, it is worth noting that while there have been few planning articles specifically dedicated to bus transport since the 1950s and 1960s (Green, 1952; Dickinson, 1961) except Bell & Cloke (1991) and Martin et al. (2008) , the role of buses in land use planning policies and research has not waned, as can be seen from the chain of work by Smeed (1964) , Proudlove (1968) , Banister (1994) , Sim et al. (2001) , Bunker & Searle (2007) , Jenks & Dempsey (2007) , Ji & Gao (2010) . Research on ferries has recently gathered momentum in planning, as exemplified by the articles of Gitlesen & Thorsen (2000) and Pooley et al. (2006) . However, research on the role of land use planning in supporting the actual operations of franchised buses and ferries as part of a covert state undertaking is rare. This is interesting, as the relationship between land use and transport is cardinal in planning policy formulation. The landmark works of Buchanan (1956) and the famous "Buchanan Report" Traffic in Towns (Buchanan & Crowther, 1964) remain standard references for subsequent reviews, such as those by Batley (1996) , Pharoah (1996) , and Ward (2007) . Yet Buchanan's emphasis between land use and transport has not stimulated examination of how district or even site level planning of bus depots and terminals could influence bus operations.
The concept of implicit contract was first developed in labour economics to explain why employers do not reduce wages when there is a slump. It has been subsequently adopted by public economists to deal with the practical issue of compensating regulated utility companies for sunken investment costs lost when the market is opened by government. It is argued that in the circumstances there is an implicit contract or "implicit compact", such that compensation is warranted (Boyd 1998 ).
The Hypothesis General Hypothesis and Approach
Applying the concept of an implicit contract to regulated transport operators, it could also be argued that the state has always been doing something implicit in favour of any franchised monopoly since its genesis, as in the case of the employer tacitly undertaking not to reduce the employee's wage in less profitable times. In this paper, we seek to examine if there is any similar implicit help given by government infrastructural planning and development directly related to the operation of privately run ferries and buses. Granted that UK bus operators in the 1920's enjoyed no more than constant returns (Mulley, 1983, p. 8) if not decreasing returns to scale ceteris paribus, nonetheless such an implicit contract should help create a decreasing cost environment for the franchisees who, in a quid pro quo, would be capable of practising efficient multiple pricing (Coase, 1946) . This would also serve a social transfer objective as an alternative to nationalisation or other forms of controlling a public utility for efficiency or equity reasons.
The foregoing consideration of argument was evaluated by a case study of the provision of An important idiosyncratic institutional feature of this case study is that the Hong Kong Government had no local government and [Referee 1 Point 2] Government was the landlord of all land (and water) and, given its constitutional status, had an absolute say in land and planning matters not easily found on other jurisdictions. However, the analysis should not therefore be regarded as no more than an Aristotelian accident. That is not least because public investment in transport infrastructure can hardly be justified as being theoretically separable from public transport franchising. In addition, there is the need to jointly consider that land use and transportation in transport theory had intellectual roots in the work of Sir Patrick Abercrombie (Abercrombie, 1933) , which predates the classic "Buchanan Report" (Buchanan & Crowther, 1964) . The former has now been receiving renewed interest under the auspices of 'sustainable development' (Haywood, 2005) . Theorem is a pure exchange model that does not accommodate production or investment.
In our case study, the history of Hong Kong public bus and ferry regulation is reconstructed with the focus on the periods of franchises; the nature of key express contractual arrangements;
and the government efforts in providing land for ferry piers in tandem with bus termini as well as for operator yards and depots. These infrastructural facilities are hypothesised to be the main implicit contract consideration provided by the government.
This Hong Kong study should be interpreted in the light of the findings that the franchised ferries and buses did complement each other in terms of turnovers and enjoyed positive returns to scale in the period.
Why is Hong Kong so interesting for transport research? The reasons are many, but the prime consideration is that while its bus and ferry fleets are among the largest in the world, they have always been able to operate as private concerns without direct public subsidies, and yet they are franchises that have to pay the government royalties and/or taxes. Hibbs (1985) also found that Hong Kong's bus industry was highly open on a comparative basis. While ferries were mainly locally built, as Hong Kong was one of the best ports of the British Empire, most buses were imported from the UK and run on highways following traffic regulations modelled after British laws. This means that Hong Kong is an ideal case for a debate over libertarian transport policies.
The Hypotheses, Methodology, and Data [Methodology added, per Editor Point 2 and Referee 2 Point 8]
To find out whether or not there have been public subsidies to franchised bus and ferries companies in Colonial Hong Kong in the form of land premium concessions during the period January 1933 to August 1972, we formulated two hypotheses to inform our evaluation:
Hypothesis 1: The conditions of the franchises of KMB, CMB, SF, and HYF from 1933 onwards did guarantee government concessions regarding their land acquisitions for garages, depots, shipyards, and workshops.
Hypothesis 2: The Crown (Government) Leases (or other title documents) for KMB and CMB's garages, depots, and workshops and SF and HYF's shipyards were obtained by way of private treaties rather than by auction or tender.
The start year was the first time public buses were regulated by government franchise, while the end time marked the opening the of the first tunnel across Victoria Harbour -an event that fundamentally transformed the relationship between the bus and ferry from a complementary into a competitive one as "tunnel bus" routes were introduced.
The methodology for evaluating Hypotheses 1 and 2 was a comprehensive archived survey of three major categories of relevant public information: franchise conditions, government memoranda, and Crown Leases relating to the land assets of bus and ferry companies.
Photocopies of the first two categories of documents were obtained from the Public Record
Office (PRO), while those for the third were purchased from the Lands Registry.
The first step in the data mining and interpretation process was to obtain the franchise documents from the PRO. To do so, there is a need to identify the number and years of each franchise grant and renewal. This was taken after a careful reading of the following sources of public information: the government's annual reports, the annual reports of each franchisee, and specialist books on the bus and ferry companies by expert authors, notably ), Davis (1994 and Johnson (1998 ) .
The second step was to identify the locations of the land assets of the franchisees devoted to construction, maintenance, and repairs of buses and ferries. This was taken after a careful reading of the same sources of public information mentioned in step one above.
The third step was to obtain the land documents for these assets from the Land Registry pr the PRO. These documents could be Crown Leases, under which land parcels were directly obtained from the Crown or Assignments, from which they were purchased from other individuals.
The third step involved the identification of the lot numbers of the land parcels according to the Lot Index Plans maintained by and deposited in the Lands Department for public inspection.
Where the land parcels used as depots or yards have not been redeveloped, the Crown Leases or assignments could be purchased from the Land Registry. obtained from the government using any method other than a PTG, Hypothesis 2 would be refuted. In case land parcels are obtained second hand by way of assignment, this hypothesis would also be refuted.
Hypothesis 1 is not refuted if there were government guarantees for the provision of cheap land, which would be a pecuniary benefit for the franchisees. In that case, there would be factual support for the criticism that developers that control the public utilities unfairly converted such land for other uses.
If Hypothesis 1 is refuted, then the idea of an implicit pecuniary benefit would be out of the question if Hypothesis 2 is also refuted. (The land administrative system of Hong Kong's leasehold system sells land at market prices through open auctions or tenders and at a concession by way of private treaty.) However, this would not rule out any non-pecuniary benefit, the existence of which is a matter of speculation.
Prior to presenting the findings for the specific hypotheses, produced below is the history of government franchising of bus and ferries reconstructed according to our documentary study.
The State in the Formation and Regulation of Transport Monopolies in Hong Kong
Narratives of Hong Kong public transportation typically (as can be found in such research endeavours of transport students and officials as Chow (2006) (Barden, 1986; Barden & Runnacles, 1986; Hills ,1984; Cullinane, 2003; Lau & Chiu, 2004; and Lam et al., 2005) and rarely dealt with specific transport planning infrastructure or land supply.
The former two companies obtained a geographical monopoly of running public buses, respectively, on Hong Kong Island and on the mainland (Kowloon and the New Territories). 1924; Road Traffic Act, 1924 and the London Passenger Transport Act, 1933 , is an underresearched area. While the formative years of bus franchises in Hong Kong happened to be the same as those for London buses (Hibbs, 1972) , there is no evidence that the Hong Kong model aimed at protecting the interests of franchised trams as researchers have identified for UK (Mulley, 1983) . Indeed in 1919 the Government had turned down an application made in 1913
for duplicating on the Kowloon side of the harbour the existing tram service along the Hong Kong Island shoreline (Leeds, 1986, p. 29) . Furthermore, an analysis of franchised buses in Hong Kong would be defective if it was divorced from the franchised ferries (and any substitutes), and vice versa, due to the geographic nature of urban Hong Kong since 1860 as one separated by the natural barrier of Victoria Harbour.
Buses
According to the historical survey of Leeds (1986, p. 24 (Davis, 1994, p. 4; Leeds, 1986, p. 23 (Davis, 1995, p. 2-11; Leeds, 1986, p. 23 Government officially regularised the status of minibuses which, in violation of the franchises, had been illegally competing with the franchised buses. As a quid pro quo, the Government paid compensation to the two franchised companies: HK$5.2 million to KMB and HK$4.3 million to CMB and structured a "financial package" which permitted their profit to be 15% of net fixed assets with a great reduction in royalties from 20% to 15% of gross receipts and finally, in 1970/1971, to zero.
Ferries
As regards ferries, our study period covers two regulatory cycles for the "Star Ferry" and three for HYF. As regards the "Star Ferry", the first period started in 1933 and ended in 1948 after a period of 15 years. The second commenced in 1949 and lasted 30 years to end on 31 January 1979 (Johnson, 1998, p. 98) . As regards HYF, the first one started in 1933 and ended in 30 June 1948 (Leeds, 1986) ; the second, as shown on a licence found in the Public Records Office, lasted Ordinance prescribed that ferries operating in specified areas had to be licensed by the Governorin-Council and provided powers of licensing and regulating ferries as well as for prescribing fees or any premium payable for a licence.
"In 1916, there were 16 ferry companies providing ferry services between two shores of the Harbour. Competition was very keen. Touting for passengers always resulted in serious fightings (sic)" (Kwan, 1999, p. 21 (Chiu, 1973, p. 45) .
Harbour Bridge, Ferries, and Buses
However, the true story of the planning for Hong Kong franchised bus-ferry services must begin with the mysterious decision of the Colonial Hong Kong Government to abandon in the idea of a method without great expenditure of money is the provision of ferry boats…We consider the cross harbour traffic between Hong Kong and Kowloon is growing sufficiently to warrant the provision by Government of a good vehicular and passenger ferry service" (Leeds, 1986, p. 31 (Lai, 1999) , that shaped the geographical and functional relationship between public ferries and buses in colonial Hong Kong up to the end of July 1972. Government was slow in implementing the Report. The decision to build a tunnel (but minus the proposed rail) was made in 1954. The Victoria City Development Ltd. (VCD) was formed and published a consultant proposal in 1961 (Bristow, 1984) . In 1966, VCD invited HYF to invest up to 25% of the venture, then new to the world, but the latter declined to accepta serious commercial mistake that would cost the company a lot, though that matter is outside our study period. In 1969, the Transport Department was formed to coordinate all transport matters.
A key question: was franchising a mere predatory tax machine?
The terms of the franchise licences for KMB, CMB, and HKF found in the Public Records
Office and the story of the "Star Ferry" by Johnson (1998) make it tempting for the uninformed to say that the Government was promoting British interests, as buses had to be of "British Empire (later simply British and then British Commonwealth) manufacture"; all ferries had to be "British ships" and the majority of the directors of the companies had to be "British subjects".
On a close analysis, these terms simply were expedient in ordering affairs as Hong Kong traffic laws were modelled on British equivalents and hence British buses would easily fit the local traffic regulations. There was no rule against Hong Kong making her own buses or ferries as these would be British by virtue of her status as a British colony. British subjects include locally born Chinese and indeed KMB, CMB and HKY were the businesses of three local Chinese families. British ships, on the other hand, meant no more than that the ferries would be built in Hong Kong by Hong Kong yards and fitted with locally constructed engines of British or local design. The record indicates that this is what happened.
It was not unreasonable to deduce from the wordings of the pre-war financial reports of Hong Kong Government that franchises were merely a form of tax. The pre-war reports mentioned that franchised companies paid royalties based on gross receipts but did not disclose the rates of levy for any company. The account in such authoritative works as Hibbs (1985 Hibbs ( , 1986 ) notes fares on ferries and buses in Hong Kong "had been controlled by the administrators of the government and remained unchanged from 1949 to 1970" (p.120). From Public Records Office archive materials, we discovered the actual rates of royalties and other franchise terms for KMB and CMB. There was virtually no government promise of any form of assistance to the operators.
Some terms could even be regressive as for instance double deckers were generally disallowed for CMB. So, to conclude that Government was a benevolent dictator interested in tapping the rent reaped by the franchisees from the monopolies it had created, while also capping their charges (i.e., imposing price controls) so that they could not fully exploit their monopoly power would not be amiss. For indeed it is true that the franchised companies and thus Government did reap profits, which grew slowly over the pre-war years as percentages of total revenue, as can be seen from the figures for three of the involved companies in Table 1 .
After the war, there was an interlude in which the Government, influenced by the new British Socialist government's strongly Keynesian thinking, sought to control profit. However, finally this was not practised and Government observed the royalty terms agreed with the operators.
These terms varied with operators. For KMB, royalty during the study period was defined as a Charging uncontrolled prices which usually far exceeded the regulated bus fares, these PLBs paid government a considerable licence fee (approx. US$500 per annum each) and triad societies "protection money".
But would it be reasonable to suppose that the Government was simply a passive protector of British interests, a revenue/profit sharer, a price regulator, or an arbiter of monopolies? As the contractual arrangement was basically either a revenue or profit sharing scheme it follows, even though it would be wrong to equate the colonial government with a mere commercial dealer, that it would make no economic sense for government not to act positively to enlarge the grantee's income so as to enlarge its own income. Indeed, as the landlord of all lands in Hong Kong, transport operations could be regarded as a use of land of the kind government depended on for revenue. This land use planning design geared towards inter-modal change, which was obviously to facilitate cross harbour passenger transport movement, was to be replicated in other areas as the city continued to expand along the waterfront on either side of the Harbour. Looking at old maps, we established that since the 1960s, bus terminals according to the latest highways standards were also planned and built inside all government public housing estates. (Tables   3A & 3B) .
Government's Involvement in Planning and Developing Transport Infrastructure
After the war, new vehicular ferry piers were added to the Central route and in the 1960s, more still to serve the HYF North Point-Kowloon City (10) and North Point-Kwun Tong (commencing beyond the study period) lines.
All ferry piers we found were built on government land and all HYF piers were designed, built, and maintained by government. All bus termini were designed, built and maintained by the Government for use by franchised operators. They were used by the franchisees without the need of any payment. Public toilets could only be found in the tolled area of ferry piers and were not a feature of bus terminals during the study period. Alan Cheung's photo in Johnson (1998, p. 65) shows that a covered waiting platform for public transport access had been available at Star Ferry's Tsimshatsui Pier as of the 1930s. However, most bus termini in Hong Kong had no bus platforms, not to mention canopies, till the 1960s. At the time when the Tsimshatsui bus terminus had got its concrete covered bus platforms, the Jordan Road Ferry bus terminus remained very Spartan in design (Photo 1), which can be compared with the much better designed North Point Passenger
Pier and Ngau Tau Kok bus termini (Photo 2). Basic as they were, these were generally considered adequate by planning and social standards at the time. However, bus and ferry terminals serve many pivotal purposes in transport operations (Steer 1979) , particularly because they allow "traffic recovery time" (13) for the vehicles or vessels so that the latter could better keep to their planned schedules. Besides, bus terminals are easily-guarded locations for the overnight parking of buses that could not be accommodated in bus depots. (14) Although these general benefits of bus terminals should be viewed in light of their actual designs (Thrower, 2009) , until the 1980s, the combination of ferry piers and bus terminals worked well for operators and passengers.
Besides piers and terminals, the Government also leased at a premium to HYF (15) and the two franchise bus operators' yards for the construction, maintenance, repair and storage of ferries and buses as well as quarters and even schools for staff and dependents. (Table 1 It is an interesting discovery, to the amazement of the authors accustomed to the norm of "private treaty grants" of government land to regulated public utilities, that not KMB, CMB, nor HKF obtained these yards free. They had purchased them from the government in land auctions during the study period when the economy of Hong Kong was still very fragile. Land for the facilities was hardly cheap. In any event, these depots and staff quarters were to become the most valuable company asset for the franchisees as land prices escalated with economic and population growth. With regard to the construction of depots by both companies, the government carried out a review with public participation to examine the cost effectiveness of the companies' operations including bus depots. It began in April 1981, and was completed in June 1982, though exactly what was concluded has not yet been found by research.
As far as buses were concerned, the availability of depots enabled two technical innovations that should be conducive to scale economies. First, they allowed the import of buses from the UK as parts (basically chassis, bus body parts and engines), which could be locally assembled and reassembled in various combinations, taking advantage of much lower labour costs in Hong
Kong. Second, they allowed major modification to and upgrading of buses in-situ.
Modifications (especially to the locations of doors and staircase) were required to enable the move to "one-man" or "driver-only" operation (20) and upgrading, typically by replacing old engines with new and more powerful engines. The most dramatic example was the CMB's double-decking programme directed by Lyndon Rees commencing 1971 to finish in 1975 (Davis, 1994, p. 60) .
Furthermore, the availability of depots meant that major overhauling, regular cleaning, repair and mounting of advertisements (a major source of non-passenger revenue) could be done in house under centralised supervision. 
At this juncture, it is worth noting that the "Hong Kong Passenger Transport Survey:
1964/1966" by E. Dalby of the UK Road Research Laboratory (the Dalby Report), as a triporigin and traffic management analysis in the tradition of the Buchanan Report, did not recommend public investment in such infrastructure as termini and depots but did mention the "absence of parking spaces" for buses (Leeds, 1986, p. 52) , an observation which surely had a bearing on the government reservation of land on town plans and subsequently the actual construction of purpose-built bus termini suitable for overnight parking The provision by government of land is obviously something "consideration past" in the law of contract and is in any event not actionable as it is not a term of the franchise contract.
However, the main theoretical significance of such payments is that they were allocated and/or developed at different time periods and thus should not be regarded as a one-off fixed cost expenditure. Instead they should have the benefit of lowering the long run operational costs of the operators by removing fixed factors such as limited curb space in old built up areas.
Furthermore, the non-monetary terms for the bus depots and ship yards were not standard but negotiated, suggesting that there was a decision making process.
Besides, there had to be economies of scale not only because of improved fare collecting technologies, (30) but also because franchise operators invested in better passenger carrying technologies impossible to achieve without working yards. 
Findings and Interpretation: the Presence and Nature of Implicit Consideration
Having thus pictured an informed history of franchised bus and ferry transport, we may now turn to the findings to our hypotheses.
Key Findings
The locations of all identifiable KMC and CMB bus depots and HYF shipyard and the methods by which their leases or land titles were obtained are recorded in Table 1 .
We found that there was no sign of land price subsidy provided within or outside the franchise or lease documents. The franchise terms did not mention any government guarantee to supply land, not to mention its provision at concessionary prices. The government rather imposed many burdens for the bus companies, including the purchase of buses of certain standards and the satisfactory maintenance of its fleet. This required KMB and CMB to buy land for the purpose of assembling, overhauling, or repairing their buses. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was refuted.
We found that all 8 depot sites for KMB and CMB were held under Crown Leases. From the Leases, land premiums were clearly paid for 5 of these and none of the rest showed any "nonassignment clauses", which suggests that they were not PTG. Further search at PRO, the conditions of sale which show the land prices paid after public auctions for the other three bus depot sites were also found. A 1958 Colonial Secretariat memo addressed to the District Commissioner, New Territories, advised the latter that unlike a utility company facility which "must be sited in a particular place", a bus depot terminus could be sited anywhere and "should be sold at auction". Together, these results point towards the credibility of the presence of an implicit consideration as a valid research proposition for further investigation, which is reported immediately below.
However, prior to that, there was a need to record the reason for suspecting the existence of government concessions as part of an implicit consideration. That consideration was twofold.
First with historical hindsight, we can infer a political compensation for the gradual loss of the full protection of franchised interests during the study period. Over the years, the government's safeguards against competition for franchised buses companies, which initially enjoyed nearexclusive franchises by region, KMB on the Kowloon Peninsula and outlying islands and CMB on Hong Kong Island, have been successively attenuated by the legalization of "public light buses" (PLBs) and the introduction of franchised maxicabs ("green minibuses"). The most persuasive evidence of the deterioration of a bus company's full monopoly status is a formal shift from a geographical franchise to a route-based franchise. Further analysis, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
Second and more fundamentally, according to the theory of implicit contracts there was from the outset a quid pro quo for government to jointly invest in public transport for the public interest. One important form of implicit consideration recognized by transport planning experts such as Runnacles (1998) is the free provision of bus terminals and ferry piers designed and built by ferry companies. These infrastructures were essential not only for the efficient handling of passengers, but where bus terminals were concerned, useful as overnight bus storage in case depots were full and for traffic recovery purposes.
Government developed a transport plan piecemeal in response to economic and demographic change, only in loose consort with housing development planning. Four stages to this can be distinguished. The embryo of subsequent integrated transport plans in the 1930-1946 period.
The first more systematic planning stage was 1946-59 with the marked growth in termini and piers. In this period, a total of 10 ferry piers and 17 bus terminals (8 for CMB and 9 for KMB)
were built by government throughout Hong Kong. The land use-public transport structure of this era is conceptualized in Figure 1 .
Then the massive growth in the 1960s where aims at reducing the density of urban development took place without ensuring a concomitant coherence of satellite town job/housing matches, thus creating increased public transport demand. The government implemented the Abercrombie Report (Lai 1999) in two ways. First, it situated many high-rise, high-density public housing estates by terracing Crown Land at the foothills of the Kowloon Range each with a major bus terminus. Second, the government also started developing the first generation new towns (Kwun Tong and Tsuen Wan) with waterfront industries on the mainland side by reclamation following certain principles of new town planning in Britain. "These new towns were used as laboratories in the search for satisfactory design relationships between the increasing traffic requirements of the day and an appropriate urban form" (Bristow 1989: 22) .
Accordingly, there was a deliberate "routing of the busway through the centre of each neighbourhood cell" (Bristow 1989:23) , and right from the beginning, ferry terminals were constructed together with bus terminals, which were very prolific in Kwun Tong. The bus routes from these terminals linked to all major terminals in other parts of the mainland. On Hong Kong Island, new rental public estates of a smaller scale and intensity were also built with similar bus or even ferry terminals (like North Point). The primacy of the Central, Jordan Road, and Tsimshatsui ferry terminals was diluted due to the proliferation of secondary bus terminals in the new towns and resettlement housing estates, but the absolute number of passenger trips handled by these three magnets grew because for one thing, they were at the heart of Hong Kong's CBD, so white collar workers commuted to their jobs in these areas from elsewhere in Hong Kong. To cross the harbour, they had to ride the ferry.
Note that this simple land use transport planning strategy of pairing ferry piers with bus terminals near major housing and industrial clusters reflected the pragmatism of expatriate planners towards the imported notion of "self-containment" or a balance between the blue collar workforce and industrial job supply within a new town. The idea was to minimize external traffic, but the reality, given the laissez faire policy of Hong Kong, was that these new towns never became self-contained, as many industrial workers on both sides of Victoria Harbour had to cross it to reach their jobs as well. In an attempt to catch up with ever-rising passenger trip demands, both the bus and ferry companies experimented with new models of bigger buses and ferries. The bus companies bought land from the government to build new depots to allow for the experimentation to take place. HYF used its own docks at Tai Kok Tsui to build larger triple decker ferries and SF relied on Whampoa to supply and maintain its fleet. From 1960 to 1969, a total of 13 ferry piers and 36 bus terminals (8 for CMB and as many as 25 for KMB) were built by government overall Hong Kong. The land use-public transport structure of this era is conceptualized in Figure 2 .
Finally the last growth period during which new transport strategies (tunnels, MTR) became embedded, initially complementing the final surges of the previous fast-growing demands, only finally undermining the basis of the old incrementally developed system in the 80s and later.
From 1970 to 1972, three more ferry piers and 13 bus terminals (2 for CMB and 11 for KMB)
were completed by government. The land use-public transport structure of this era is presented in Figure 3 .
Throughout the key element in the state's ability to adjust and adapt lay in its role as ultimate landlord. This ensured government was able to provide implicit consideration to public transport franchisees. In its turn that helped government to maintain social harmony in a low labour cost economy by keeping transport fares low and providing a relatively multi-modal and efficient public transport network.
Conclusion
This study in the history and economics of franchised buses and ferries of early post-war colonial Hong Kong drew attention to the role played by the government as franchisor-landlord in providing essential infrastructural support. The key infrastructural support we considered significant was government planning, granting and development of as many as 83 bus termini each being more than 1 ha, 26 ferry piers, and 8 bus depots and 1 shipyard in tandem with new town and public housing development according to the Abercrombie Report. More than just building bus terminals and ferry piers, the government made a great contribution by planning the timely combination of bus terminals and piers on government land, as well as strategically positioning the bus terminals in newly-developed government housing estates and new towns. Notes 1. The story of the famous Aldenham Overhaul Work of London Transport, opened in 1956, is a case in point. 2. The term "implicit contract" is not used to refer to specific benefits to avoid entangling the analysis, which is qualitative, with high mathematical expositions in the literature for implicit contracts. A contract must have "consideration," but not vice versa. 3. A well-known example of an implicit benefit granted to franchisees is that IN PRACTICE (I.E. BY WAY OF INFORMAL CONVENTION) traffic police will not prosecute bus drivers when they carry too many passengers, do not park their buses quite within the authorized bus parking zones by bus stops, or when their buses emit too much smoke, which is a favour that has never been granted to taxis or non-franchised red maxicabs. 4. Organised by Dorabjee Nowrojee, which started in 1880 with 4 vessels named Morning Star, Evening Star, Rising Star and Guiding Star. 5. It would be reasonable to suppose that it would have been sometime in the 1860s, possibly as a sideshow to the implementation of the British Merchant Shipping Act. There is also the matter of the licensing of the drivers (in ferries, coxswains). We read in Johnson (1998, p. 33) that, following an accident in 1891, the coxswain of the Morning Star "lost his certificate for six months." 6. It is not clear [Referee 1, Point 5] whether this apparently irrational decision was indeed forced upon the Government by the dictates of defence strategy that cumulated in the 1936 Hong Kong Defence Scheme or indeed was simply the result of successful anti-bridging lobbying of the ferry operators. 7. Jubilee Street after the Second World War (HYF ferries to Kowloon (Mongkok) from 18
November 1964 at the new harbour routes pier; Silvermine Bay-Ping Chau, Cheung Chau and Tai O at the new outlying islands pier from 27 August 1966), Wanchai (HYF ferries 22. During the communist riots in the 1950s and 1960s, some buses not kept inside depots were burned out by sabotage and more than 20 Daimler "Jumbo" aluminium-body buses of CMB were burned down by arson in the 1970s. 23. Davis (1994, pp. 5-7, 225 to 236; 1995, pp.18, 290-295, 298 to 301) . 24. Davis (1996: p.17) . 25. Hong Kong and Yau Ma Ti Ferry Co. Ltd. (1973) ; Johnson (1998); Hong Kong Annual Reports, Hong Kong Government (various years from 1946 Hong Kong Government (various years: 1961 ). 26. It was most unfortunate that the period immediately after the opening of the harbour tunnel coincided with the Bus Grant and union activism and "three-day-weeks" in the UK (Davis 1994:138) , which taxed her new bus production capacity, so that both CMB and KMB had to rely on second hand buses, such as the Guy Arab IV double deckers and the Leyland Titan PD3/4, which were often older than the stock on hand. 27. Mr. Mike Davis informed the authors that overnight parking of CMB buses at Aldrich Bay Street bus station, which could allow kerb side parking, was discontinued by the Transport Department. 28. The detail involved the surrender of 2 pieces of adjoining individual marine lots (Kowloon Marine Lots Nos. 42 and 77) acquired by HYF and HKS at Tai Kok Tsui. For this the companies were regranted a much larger consolidated industrial site together with three other marine lots (78, 79 and 80), including an additional 11,700 sq. feet of land extended seawards. These 5 lots remained governed by 5 separate Crown Leases instead of one Crown Lease. This favourable practice permitted piecemeal resale or redevelopment no longer possible today. 29. A special condition laid down was that if any company operating a bus service so desired, the successful tenderers might be required by the Governor in Council to purchase at such time as the Governor in Council may direct, under some method of valuation to be determined by the Government, all or any suitable vehicles, repair plant and machinery, lands and buildings and materials used by the company for the purpose of undertaking prior to the 1oth June, 1933 (Passage entitled "Omnibus Services: Confirmation of Local Monopolies for Fifteen Years", of unknown source, as quoted in Davis (1994, p.10 )) 30. CMB made the first successful move to a one-man operation as, unlike KMB which retained the rear doors of their preferred Daimler models, the Guy buses had doors close to the drivers' cabins. 31. HYF replaced coal-fired with diesel-powered ferries and began to build a fast, partly airconditioned three-storey fleet in the late 1960s. It was also a pioneer in the use of hovercraft when services were extended to Tsuen Wan and speed of service became essential to remain competitive after the opening up of the Harbour Tunnel. Equally, with such things as doubleended vessels, with which "Star" Ferry were an early pioneer, double decks, diesel-electric drive (as early as 1933), and various ways to improve docking, including guiding spring piles, and experiments with berthing parallel to the shore vis-à-vis alongside jetties at right angles to the shore. The "Star" Ferry company also constantly innovated to keep pace with steadily increasing traffic. 32. Trial models, however, were fully assembled in UK and often imported in complete units. Figures 1 to 3 supplement the land use classification models used by such experts in geography as Drakakis-Smith (1979: p.33 ) by adding in an element of transportation. In terms of bus networking, the KMB system was circuitous and can be conceptualised as two triangles with their common apex the Jordan Road Ferry bus terminus. The base angles of the Deleted: paralysed expansion in urban triangle were Tsuen Wan in the west and Kwun Tong in the east. The other triangle had their base angles in rural towns of Yuen Long and Sheung Shui. The CMB network did not have a complete circuit round the island and consisted of a east-west coastal urban axis from Shaukiwan to Kennedy Town, punctuated by four major ferry termini (Macau Ferry, Central, Wanchai and North Point) which sub-urban routes to the hilly areas on the north and the coastal spots on the south of the Island. Compare this to the a-historical networks proposed in Wang and Po (2001: p.267 ).
